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Response
Minh Ta

With the onset of globalization producing major ruptures in the
modern nation-state and undermining the boundaries, both
physical and metaphysical, that shape them, the age-old questions of “Who am I?” and “What am I?” are once again emerging. It is this theme of the “Divided Self,” or identity within the
context of globalization, that Dr. Comaroff attempts to address
in her essay. My response is structured in three parts: first, I
underscore what I think are some of the major contributions of
Dr. Comaroff’s essay; second, I discuss my disagreements; and
finally, I articulate my own perspective by introducing two concepts within critical social theory — “performativity” and “intersectionality”—which I think might be helpful in our discussions
surrounding the theme of the Roundtable.
I. Contributions
I find three elements of Dr. Comaroff’s analysis to be worthy of
particular note. These are: first, the extraordinary emergence of
multinational capital (facilitated by “virtual, electronic money”),
which is precipitating the breakdown of nation-states; second,
the development of a “global social imaginary” facilitated by the
expansion of sophisticated communications networks that seem
to be eroding “national identities”; and finally, the rise of “hetero-nationalist” movements. According to Dr. Comaroff, these
three factors are most responsible for the peculiarity of the phenomenon of globalization.
In exploring these issues, Dr. Comaroff suggests that as a
result of the dominance of transnational capitalism, the integrity
and validity of nation-states as a whole is beginning to break
down. She tells us that “few products or transactions are purely
‘national’ anymore.”1 On the contrary, they are truly “icons of
multinationalism.” The “American” car that is currently on the
road might have actually been built in Mexico under exploitative labor practices, with parts from Europe. Ironically, some of
the cars that are labeled “foreign” might actually have a more
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legitimate claim to being “American” vehicles than those that
are touted as truly domestic. It is this “estrangement,” in a sense,
between nation-states and the products that carry their names
that I would like to suggest is another major effect of globalization. Similar to Marx’s discussion on “Estranged Labour,” the
forces of globalization are perpetuating the alienation between
nation-states and their products.2
The development of an electronic, “virtual” monetary system
has strongly facilitated the successful emergence of multinational capital. Here again, the ability of transnational corporations to move and relocate at will strongly rests on the erosion of
the power of nation-states. Before the introduction of “virtual”
money, states had the ability to control wealth within their
domains by their monopolistic control of the money supply and
their power to impose taxes on their citizens and corporations.
But with an electronic monetary system, the ability of nationstates to regulate these exchanges has become less effective.
Nation-states and the “world,” it seems, are at the mercy of
multinational capital.
This dissolution of the dominance of the nation-state coincides with the emergence of a “global” social imaginary that has
been facilitated by the ever-expanding reach of sophisticated,
revolutionary communications technologies. The paradox of the
movement toward “oneness” (i.e., that we are all a part of an
interdependent global community) within an explosion of difference and diversity embedded in globalization is further
accentuated by these innovative technologies. As Dr. Comaroff
correctly states, these technologies allow distant populations to
share the same “signals beamed to their [satellite] dishes [that]
evade control — control once exercised by states and governments — over flows of images and information, flows integral to
the creation of collective consciousness and national ‘publics.’ ”3
The possible consequences are truly radical; chief among them is
the fact that the nation-state no longer is the center of production of values and meaning. This, according to Dr. Comaroff, is
the basis for the assertion of difference and the explosion of
what is popularly known as identity politics, firmly rooted in
“hetero-nationalism.” Dr. Comaroff very astutely points out that
the eruption of multiple claims of ethnic identity, as a result of
the breakdown of the modern nation-state, is itself grounded in
145
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assertions of “nationhood.” The irony of the situation is that as
ethnocentric movements attempt to break out against the modern nation-states, they are also appropriating the same language
of nationhood. Hence the emergence and popularity of groups
such as Queer Nation, the Nation of Islam, Serbian Nation, etc.
II. Critique
So where does this leave us in relation to the self and identity in
a global age? It is at this point that I would like to articulate
what I perceive to be some of the shortcomings in Dr.
Comaroff’s analysis and, thereby, present some of my disagreements. The main focus of my critique will be on the implicit presumptions surrounding the construction of the self and identity,
and the relationships and dynamics between the two that are
embedded in Dr. Comaroff’s essay. Specifically, I want to raise
three concerns: the over-reliance on the unity of the self, the distinct inclination toward dualities/dichotomies, and, finally, her
subtle but Marxist materialist constructions of the world.
A. The Unity of the Self
Throughout Dr. Comaroff’s essay, the self is never really
directly mentioned; it is alluded to and presumed to be intricately linked to the nation-state, which is accurate in the modernist framework, but what happens to the self in this the “post”
age? It should be noted that within the realm of social theory,
the relationship between the self and society is far from
resolved; it remains a hotly contested topic. In addition, it
should be acknowledged that within the modernist framework,
the Self is intricately linked to the notion of the Other in an
unequal duality of the Self/Other. Consequently, I would like to
pose these questions: How is the Self (and the Other) now constituted and situated in this global age? Does this dichotomy of
the Self/Other still exist? And if so, how are power dynamics
and relations constructed between the two?
In her essay, Dr. Comaroff stresses that the destabilization of
the modern nation-state is a key element of the global age and,
therefore, offers “hetero-nationalism” as one way to capture the
formation of identity in a global age. As Dr. Comaroff states:
146
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“Exchanges of this sort are common these days, not least
because most polities are actually ‘hetero-nationalist,’ i.e.,
hybrids that seek to reconcile ethnic identity politics with a
Euro-nationalist conception of civil society.”4 Even in the formation of these “hybrids,” it is quite clear that Dr. Comaroff leans
toward a conception of the self and hence society, that, though
divided, is still “unified” in its division and acceptance of the
self. The reason I am raising such a fuss about the notion of the
self is that I want to make the explicit argument that the acceptance of the notion of the self comes with a number of ontological presumptions. In the past (and, to a certain extent, the
present) these presumptions included the assumption of the Self
as heterosexual, white, and male with the Other being Woman,
Oriental, Black, etc. Let me be clear that I am not alleging that
Dr. Comaroff is making such specific claims, but because of the
author’s silence on these issues, I can only speculate on her
assumptions.
Viewed from a postmodern perspective, the embracing of the
notion of a self inherently holds certain ontological conditions.
As Michael Shapiro writes, “Within such a view, knowledge of
the self is not a process of accretion but rather a form of power, a
way of imposing an interpretation. . . . It is a form of subjugation
rather than part of a process of enlightenment.”5 The question
before us, then, is not “What is the self?” but rather “Which
self?” The notion of a divided self has within its terminology the
notion of a singular self; it is still this unity within one (though
divided) that I would like to contest, and I suggest that we
instead view the self as multiple selves and not in a single formation.
B. Dichotomies and Dualities
Dr. Comaroff’s bias toward dichotomies/dualities also presents
some difficulties. She writes,
The complexity of the current moment lies not in the fact that it is
definitively postmodern, postindustrial, or post-anything [emphasis added] else. Instead, it combines core features of the modern
world in unfamiliar, uneasy combinations — speeded up,
stretched to the breaking point, recombined — whose very unfa-

147

04/15/97 3:10 PM

0908ta03.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 4

miliarity is made plain by market forces of new intensity, new
possibility.6

Dr. Comaroff seemingly has clumped a number of very different
and diverse critical social theories into one amorphous mass signified by “post-.” It is this general conglomeration of significantly varied critical theories without differentiating them and
their contribution to the overall discourse that I find particularly
troublesome. Dr. Comaroff must realize that postcolonialism,
postmodernism, and poststructuralism, though all sharing some
similarities are, nonetheless, quite distinct and should be recognized as such.
C. The Return of Marx
Finally, I would like to question some of the subtle Marxist
materialistic overtones of Dr. Comaroff’s analysis. The following
passage seems to affirm this issue by insinuating that the politics
of self and identity are, in the final analysis, mystifications.
[T]he language of identity politics cannot adequately address the
history of its own making. Nor can it explain itself in terms other
than its own ideology. As a result, it obscures and mystifies the
very processes that continue to marginalize many peoples and to
widen the gap between privilege and privation on a planetary
scale.7 (Emphasis added.)

The consequence of this perspective is that, following the reasoning of Marx, the use of the language of identity politics (race,
ethnicity, gender) is merely a mystification strategy cast to prevent the working classes from uniting around the “true” notion
of the self that is rooted in a classist, materialist struggle. Since
Dr. Comaroff explicitly disregards notions of essentialism, I am
struck by this possible reference to primordialism. What specifically in the language of identity politics is mystifying? Is there
some form of a “truer” self to which Dr. Comaroff is referring? I
make these points only to uncover some implicit assumptions
within Dr. Comaroff’s analysis.
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III. Reflections
Finally, I would like introduce two notions within critical social
theory—“intersectionality” and “performativity”—into our discussion concerning the divided self and the formation of identity in a global age. Intersectionality, a term coined by critical race
scholar Kimberle Crenshaw, attempts to draw and analyze the
intersections (and the embedded power dynamics) of different
social categorizations such as race, gender, and class in their formation of social positioning and identity. Performativity, coined
by gender theorist Judith Butler, speaks to how gender and sexual identities are played out, i.e., “performed.” It is from these
theoretical perspectives that I will attempt to argue that identity
is an effect of multiple discursive frameworks (e.g., race, ethnicity, class, gender). This effect has been further unleashed by the
forces of globalization and carried out through performances
that are acts and repetitions. It is my hope that by introducing
these two concepts of critical social theory, we will be able to
begin to deconstruct the hegemonic notions embedded in the
“self” and, subsequently, create alternative, oppositional spaces
to view identity formulation.
Identity is an effect (à la Foucault) formed within the intersections of different discursive frameworks. This effect is later carried out through performances in the real, hence identity is, in a
sense, a performance. Notions of the self (who am I, and what
am I?) have always been areas of contested terrain with competing “selves” struggling to exercise dominance. Subjects/Selves
are sites of political intersectional power investments that can be
viewed through the process of performances, i.e., the “playing
out” of identities. Performativity, then, is the instrument by
which societal norms are created and “naturalized.” These acts
and performances are neither voluntary nor a product of individual choice, but rather, in order for the self to be identified
and intelligible, must be constantly and repetitively performed
until they become second nature. Moreover, all notions of identity are based on and rooted in specific ideologies and historical
frameworks; there is, therefore, no essential, primordial
self/identity. Furthermore, the notion of the “divided selves”
comes much closer to representing the multiplicity and ambigu-
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ous nature of identity and identities than the concept of the unified, coherent self or a singular divided self.
Let me use the examples of Gangsta Rap and Andean folk
dresses mentioned in the essay for clarification. Dr. Comaroff
states that “ethnic movements, far from eschewing translocal
signs and commodities, often deploy them, brilliantly, in assertions of primordial tradition.”8 Hence the use of authentic ethnic
“artifacts” and embracement of “ethnic” primordial identities is
being appropriated in the name of identity politics. It is within
this environment that “authentic” Andean folk dresses can be
made of “non-authentic” synthetic polyester because the folk
dress is a cultural icon that is being employed in the performing
of an “original” ethnic identity. Likewise, American Gangsta
Rap can serve as a medium for “colored” identity politics in
South Africa. Gangsta Rap, with its strong subversive overtones
against traditional White hegemony, is being performed/appropriated by South African Black youth to create an oppositional
imaginary that allows for their inclusion, i.e., for their identity to
emerge. In this new global age, with the displacement of the
modern unified “self,” new selves and identities are being constantly formulated and contested.
In both cases, the usage of cultural artifacts such as folk
dresses and Gangsta Rap is a part of an effort to reify ethnic
identities. An authentic, indigenous Andean and an apartheidfree black South African identity are both effects of these discursive frameworks. It is within these performances that a referring
back (hence repeating) to a “primordial” identity is made in an
attempt to claim naturalness and authenticity. In the end, these
performances are attempts to create different, inclusive cultural
maps in which formerly marginalized groups are included.
IV. Conclusion
Whether one buys into the notion of globalization or not, the
world in which we live is definitely at a crossroads. Our old
ways of conceptualizing ourselves and the world have become
antiquated. Dr. Comaroff is right: “the nature of the play has
changed before our very eyes.”9 Her apt analysis of global identity based on her extraordinary work in South Africa has provided a wonderful springboard for our discussions. What I have
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tried to do in my response is to provide some alternative rereadings of Dr. Comaroff’s essay. I have done so by emphasizing the
instability of the notions of both identity and, particularly, the
self.
My point in stressing the problematic nature of the usage of a
singular self over multiple selves is not purely semantic. Rather,
I want to force us to reexamine and challenge all the presumptions, both implicit and explicit, concerning the self and identity.
Who we are now is inevitably tied into who we once were, but
that does not automatically mean that we are locked into these
former beliefs and doctrines. If such were the case, there would
be little room for who we can become in a continuously mutating global age.
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